

Control

- Most basically, agents control states of affairs. (E.g., the chap on the right controls *his walking on the tightrope*.)
- An agent, S, controls a state of affairs, A, to degree N iff S's pro-attitudes non-deviantly cause A and make A probable to degree N. (Our tightrope-walker intends to walk across the rope, which causes him to do so, and makes it probable he will.)
- There are three types of degrees of control one may exercise over *objects*: effectiveness, fineness and extent. (Our walker controls his body and the rope to a high degree of each: he is *effective* (or reliable) in producing his action, he produces *fine* movement, and he controls many states of affairs concerning his body and the rope—i.e. he controls each to a large *extent*.)



Various questions remain: What exactly is non-deviant causation? What other types of degrees of control are there? How do we measure degrees of control? How does this conception of control relate to questions of free will and determinism? How should we understand the idea that agents *make probable* states of affairs? Does control require the ability to do otherwise?

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